第七部分 有机的自然观 (第61节-第70节)
61. And compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum and thus all matter is connected together and in the plenum every motion has an effect upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however great. And consequently every body feels the effect of all that takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time as in place: sympnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its complexity is infinite.
复合物在这一方面类似于单纯实体。既然一切都是充实的,所有的物体就都相互联系在一起,在充实之中,每一运动对于遥远的物体都能产生与其距离相对应的影响,因而每一物体不仅受与它相接触的物体影响,以某种方式感受到发生在他们身上的一切事情,而且受与它直接接触的物体相邻近之物的间接影响。由此可知,这种事物间的相互交往延伸到无限遥远的距离。因为,每一物体都能感受到所有发生在宇宙中的事情的效果,从而,洞察一切的人能在每一事物中看到各处所发生的事,甚至那些已经发生的或将要发生的,能在当下看到那些时间上和空间上甚为遥远的事情。正如希波克拉底①所说的,sympnoia panta
(万物相通)。但灵魂在自身中只能看到那些被清晰表象的东西;而不能立刻打开封藏在自身中的所有东西,因为其繁复性是无穷的。
① 希波克拉底 ,约公元前 460460460-约公元前 约公元前 370, 370, 370, 370, 370, 古希腊 名医, 被称为医药之父 。
解释:
由这一节起,莱布尼茨开始集中谈论有形体、广延的自然界。在自然界中万事万物是互相联系、互相影响的,因为自然是一个充实,没有虚空的隔离,一个事物的运动、变化必通过力学定律传导到所有地方。这种现象界的普遍联系与本体界的单子之间的普遍联系是非常不同的:前者是通过力学定律的外部影响,后者则是基于每个单子内部都包含了与所有其他单子的关系。
既然宇宙在本质上是无数的精神性的单子,那么有广延的自然界从何而来呢?这恐怕是莱布尼茨哲学中最困难的问题之一。《单子论》第二节中说“复合物只是单纯物的集合或堆积”,这显然不能从字面上去理解,因为无广延的单子无论如何堆积也堆不出有广延的物质。笔者认为,可通过莱布尼茨的表象理论或知觉理论对物质世界的形成作出较合理的解释。如前所说,每个单子都表象着或知觉着所有的单子,由于单子知觉的有限性和含混性,在其知觉或表象中就不可避免地存在着某种扭曲和变形,这样一来,原本无广延的单子世界就被表象为或构造成有广延的物质世界了。这种表象出物质世界的混乱的知觉应该处于无意识的层面,这样,物质世界就独立于人和动物的意识而获得其自在性,是“有着良好基础的现象”(well-founded phenomena)。
这种表象理论的解释还可以为莱布尼茨的物质是单子的堆积的说法提供某种说明。既然物质世界是被无意识的混乱知觉所表象出的现象,其本质是无数的单子,在某种比喻的、不严格的意义上,我们可以说“物质是单子的堆积”。更贴切一些的比喻说法应该是“无数的单子被无意识的混乱知觉堆集成有广延的物质世界”。
62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a special way. (Theod. 400.)
尽管每一个被创造的单子都表象整个宇宙,但它表象特别属于它的、以它为隐得来希的形体更为清晰;由于这一形体通过与在充实中的所有物体的联系而反映整个宇宙,灵魂也通过表象这一以特别的方式属于它的形体而表象整个宇宙。(参见《神正论》第400节)
解释:
从逻辑的角度来分析,单子的形态可分为三个阶段,第一,单子最本源的形态是纯精神的实体。第二,由于单子的无意识的知觉的混乱的表象作用,物质世界产生出来与单子相对。第三,为了更好地表象物质世界,单子通过与某些物质紧密联系以具有躯体或形体,从而成为现实的个体或复合的实体。这三个阶段只是逻辑意义上的,并不表示单子在时间中现实地经历了三个阶段。
63. The body belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its soul) constitutes along with the entelechy what may be called a living being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. Now this body of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order, there must also be order in that which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently there must be order in the body, through which the universe is represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)
形体附属于单子,而单子是其隐得来希或灵魂,形体和隐得来希一起构成了生物,和灵魂一起构成了动物。生物或动物的形体总是有机的,因为每一单子以自身的方式是宇宙的一面活的镜子,而宇宙又为完美的秩序所统御,那么在表象它的东西中,也就是灵魂的知觉中,必定也存在着秩序,从而在形体中,通过它宇宙被表象于灵魂,也存在着秩序。(参见《神正论》第403节)
解释:
单子的形体与普通的复合物(如一块石头)不同,形体是为单子所统一起来的,而石头则是被力学定律所聚集在一起。单子之中包含了宇宙(无数单子所组成的系列)的完美秩序,当单子在赋予形体以统一性的时候,这种完美秩序也在某种程度上被赋予形体,从而形体具有了有机性,而不仅仅是量的聚集。
64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.)
因而,每一生物的有机形体都是一个神圣的机器,或一台无限地优越于任何人造的自动机器的自然的自动机器。因为人的技艺所制造的机器的每一部分并非机器。例如黄铜齿轮的齿的部分或断片对我们而言就不再是人造物,它们不具有机器的特征,因为它们不能表现出齿轮的用途。而自然的机器,即有机体,在其无限小的部分仍是机器。这正是自然与技艺之间、也就是说神的技艺与我们的技艺之间的区别所在。(参见《神正论》第134节, 第146节,第194节, 第403节)
解释:
与早期近代哲学中把形体视为机器的机械论观点不同,莱布尼茨认为生物的形体是神圣的机器即上帝造的机器,完全不同于人造的机器。在形体中,部分与整体互相关联,以致无限小的部分仍表现出整个神圣机器的特性和功能。形体的这种有机的部分与整体的统一性来源于起在生物中主导作用的单子,因为单子是多中之一,在自身中容纳了整个宇宙,当单子与形体结合时,就把这种有机性赋予了形体。
65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe. (Theod. Prelim., Disc. 70, and 195.)
自然的创造者能够运用这一神圣的和无比神奇的技艺能力,因为物质的每一部分不仅是无限可分的,如古人所观察的那样,而且实际上可以无止境地再分割,每一部分都可分为更小的部分,而任一部分都有其自身的运动;否则,物质的每一部分就不可能反映整个宇宙了。(参见《神正论》,导论,第70节, 第195节)
66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, souls.
由此可知,在物质的最小的微粒中也有一个生物--有机体、动物、隐得来希和灵魂--的世界。①
解释:
这两节进一步说明了生物形体的有机性。在这里整体与部分的统一性从形体与其部分扩展到形体与宇宙,从而形体的任一微小的部分都有一个生物的世界,而不仅仅是一个生物。
这两节看上去似乎是泛指物质而言,即包括生物的形体也包括无机物。但这样解释的话逻辑上会遇到困难,因为无机物的部分和整体之间虽然可以通过力学定律相影响,但不存在着有机的统一关系。
67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant, each member(orga n)of every animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden or pond.
物质的每一部分都可被视为是一个长满植物的花园,或一个充满着鱼的池塘。而植物的每一枝条、动物的每一肢体以及它的体液的每一滴,都也是这样的花园或池塘。
68. And though the earth and the air which are between the plants of the garden, or the water which is between the fish of the pond, be neither plant nor fish; yet they also contain plants and fishes, but mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us.
尽管花园中的植物之间的土壤和空气,或者池塘里的鱼之间的水,不是植物或鱼,但它们也包含了植物和鱼,只是通常极为细微而不为我们所觉察。
解释:
在莱布尼茨看来,土壤、空气、水虽然自身并不是有生命的有机体,但却包含了无数微小的生物,当时刚发现不久的显微镜被莱布尼茨视为对他的理论提供了很好的说明。这样一来,整个世界就都充满了生命,没有一个地方不具有有机性。
从另一个角度看,按照莱布尼茨的理论,既然现实世界是所有可能世界中最完满的,而且生命体比无机物具有更高的完满性,那么上帝就没有理由不使整个自然界都具有有机性。
69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in a pond at a distance, in which one would see a confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. (Theod. Pref. [E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44].)
因而,在宇宙中没有任何荒芜的、贫瘠的或死亡的东西,没有任何混沌和混乱,除了表面现象之外。有些像远处的池塘所显现的那样,人们只能远远看到鱼的群集和混乱的运动,而不能看清鱼本身。(参见《神正论》,前言,[E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44])
解释:
在承认世界的有机性的同时,莱布尼茨并未否定世界的机械性,只是认为机械性是现象性的,世界的本质则在于有机性。
70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has also its dominant entelechy or soul.
由此可知,每一个活的形体都有一个主导性的隐得来希,在动物中则是灵魂;但这一活的形体的肢体中充满了别的生物、植物、动物,它们中的每一个又有自己的主导性的隐得来希或灵魂。
解释:
值得注意的是,莱布尼茨虽然认为真正的个体是精神性的单子,但现实的个体(除了上帝之外)却总是复合性的,是由单子与形体构成的生命体,莱布尼茨又称此为复合实体(compound substance)。由于形体的无限可分性,在每一复合实体的内部都存在着无数的层面,每一层面都充满了各种生命的小宇宙,是对大宇宙的映射。
莱布尼茨似乎没有严格区别复合实体与复合物(compound),但两者的所指应该有所不同。复合实体指形体与灵魂组成生命体,有着显著的个体性和有机性;而复合物一般指有广延的物质,尽管莱布尼茨最终认为一切物质都充满了生命。