49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod. 32, 66, 386.)

就创造物具有完善性而言，它被认为是向外作用，就其是不完善的而言，它与他物的关系是承受性的或消极的。因而，就单子具有清晰的知觉而言，它具有积极性（活动），就其知觉是混乱的而言，它具有消极性（情感）。（参见《神正论》第32节，第66节，第386节）

50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this, that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account that the former is said to act upon the latter.

一个创造物之所以比另一个更完满在于，在更完满之物中能找到可先验地解释发生在较不完满之物中的事情的理由，也正因此，前者被认为是作用于后者。

51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)

但在单纯实体中，一个单子对另一单子的影响仅是观念性的，只有通过上帝的中介才能发生效果，因为在上帝的观念中，每一单子都有权要求，上帝在万物之初规定其他单子的时候应该关注到它。既然一个被创造的单子不能对另一单子的内部存在具有任何物理的影响，那么只有凭借这一方式一个单子才能依赖于另一单子。（参见《神正论》第9节, 第54节, 第65节, 第66节, 第201节；节略，异议3）

解释：

单子既然没有可供外物出入的窗户，单子间的相互作用就不可能是现实的，而只能是观念性的：即每个单子都独立的运动、变化，而彼此之间却能够保持一种协调性和一致性，显得好像在相互作用似的。单子之间之所以能够彼此协调，是由于上帝在创世之初的预先安排。在莱布尼茨看来，只有使一个单子与其它的所有单子保持和谐一致，才能使现实世界具有最高的完满性和实在性。这就是他的“前定和谐”理论。

52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)

因而，在创造物中能动与被动是相互的。当上帝比较两个单纯实体时，在每一个中都发现迫使他使另一个适应于它的理由，因而从一个角度看是主动的东西，从另一角度看则是被动的；它是主动的，是就我们在其中清晰地知道能够解释在另一实体中所发生的事而言，说它是被动的，是就在其中所发生的事的解释须在我们于另一实体中所清晰地知道的东西中寻求而言。（参见《神正论》第66节）

53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196-199，225, 414-416.)

既然在上帝的观念中具有无限多的可能世界，而只有其中之一才能成为现实的，那么上帝的选择就必须有一个充足理由，以使他选择这一个而不是另一个。（参见《神正论》第8节，第10节，第44节，第173节，第196-199节，第225节，第414－416节）

54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance], or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 130，167, 201, 345-347,350，352，354.)

这一理由只能在这些世界所拥有的合适性或完满性的程度中寻找，因为每一可能事物都有权要求与它所拥有的完满性的多少相适应的存在。（参见《神正论》第74节，第130节，第167节，第201节，第345-347节，第350节，第352节，第345节）

55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)

也正因此，智慧使上帝认识到最佳者的实际存在，上帝的善使他选择它，上帝的力量则使他产生它。（参见《神正论》第8节, 第78节, 第80节, 第84节, 第119节，第204节，第206节，第208节；节略，异议1，异议8）

56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)

这种所有创造物与每一创造物的联系或适应，以及每一创造物对所有创造物的联系和适应，意味着每一单纯实体都具有表现所有其他单子的关系，因而，它是宇宙的一面永恒的活的镜子。（参见《神正论》第130节, 第360节）

解释：

单子“是宇宙的一面永恒的活的镜子”并不是说单子实际上表象着宇宙，而是说一个单子的与其他单子的和谐性，使其自身内部包含有所有与其他单子的关系，就好像在表象整个宇宙似的。也就是说，由于单子没有窗户，它只能表现自身。但由于单子包含了整个宇宙的关系，它自身就是个无比深邃的小宇宙，所以单子之表现自身也就是像在表象着宇宙。

57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad. (Theod. 147.)

正如同一城市从不同角度去看，会显得非常不同，好像因视角的不同而变成了许多城市；同理，由于有着无数多的单纯实体，就好像有无数不同的宇宙，而这不过是从每一单子的独特视角来观看同一宇宙所产生的不同景观。（参见《神正论》第147节）

58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124, 241, 214－243, 275.)

这就是获得最大可能的多样性同时又具有最大可能的秩序的方法；也就是说，它是获得最大可能的完满性的方法。（参见《神正论》第120节, 第124节，第241节, 第241－243节, 第275节）

解释：

“多样性”与“秩序”是“完满性”的不可或缺的两个方面。仅有“多样性”世界会一片混乱，仅有“秩序”世界会非常单调。在莱布尼茨看来，现实世界只有同时具有最大可能的“多样性”与“秩序”，才是最完满的，才能显示出作为建筑师的上帝的无比伟大。

59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God—more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them.

此外，唯有这一假设（我冒昧地认为它已获得证明）才能恰当地赞美上帝的伟大；贝尔先生在他的辞典（“罗拉留”辞条）中提出反对意见时意识到了这一点，实际上他倾向于认为，我归于上帝的太多了——超过了可能被归于的。但他找不出任何理由来反对这种普遍的和谐，据此每一单子都通过它所具有的与所有其他单子的关系来确切地反映它们。

60. Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are. For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely, those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions.

进而，在我刚才所说的话中，可找到为什么事物不可能是其他情形的先天理由。因为在上帝规定整体的时候必须考虑到部分，尤其是要考虑到每一单子。单子的本质既然在于表象，那就没什么能限制它只表象一部分事物；尽管这种表象在相关于整个宇宙的繁多的特殊事物时确实是混乱的，而只在相关于很小的一部分事物时是清晰的，即那些与它最接近或关系最大的事物；否则单子就会是神了。单子之受限制，不在于单子的对象，而在于认识对象的方式。他们都以混乱的方式追求着无限和全体；但他们因自身的知觉的清晰程度而受限制和相区别。

解释：

值得注意的是，由于单子没有可供外物出入的窗户，严格地说，单子并不表象外物。但由于小宇宙与大宇宙之间的和谐一致，单子之表现自身也就是在表象宇宙了。由于单子的有限性，它对宇宙的表象必然是存在着不同程度的混乱，只有上帝才能完全清晰地表象宇宙。