10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each.

我还认为以下观点是理所当然的，即每一创造物，因而每一被创造的单子都是变化着的，而且这一变化在每一事物中都是持续不断的。

11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. (Theod. 396, 400.)

由前可知，单子的自然变化源于一个内在的原则，因为外在的原因不能对它们的内部产生影响。（参见《神正论》第396节、第400节）

解释：

在早期近代哲学中，莱布尼茨以其动态的实体观而独树一帜，在他看来，单子处于永恒运动之中，且这种运动源于自身。这对当时由于机械力学的影响而在哲学界流行的静态的实体观而言是一个有力的批判。

12. But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple substances.

但是，除了变化的原则之外，还必须有一个变化的特殊系列，它构成了单纯实体的特殊性和不同性。

13. This particular series of changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in that which is simple. For, as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.

这一变化的特殊系列应该在单元或单纯物中包涵多样性。因为，每一自然的变化都是逐渐发生的，有些东西变化了，而另一些东西没有变；从而，单纯实体尽管没有部分，它必须具有很多性质和关系。

解释：

所谓“变化的特殊系列”是指单子运动的整个过程。对莱布尼茨而言，单子既是“一”又是“多”。单子的“一”是指单子的没有量的规定的单纯性，单子的“多”一般指它必须具有若干的性质。值得注意的是，当莱布尼茨从“变化的特殊系列”来谈单子的“多”时，意义比较独特，侧重于动态的、系统的角度。

14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal.

这一在单元或单纯实体中包涵并表现多样性的暂时状态正是所谓知觉，如下所说，知觉应该与统觉或意识区别开来。在这一点上笛卡尔派的观点极其错误，因为他们把人们意识觉察不到的知觉视为是不存在。这也使他们认为只有心灵才是单子，而不存在动物的灵魂或其他的隐得来希。因而，他们像平常人一样，不能把长期的无意识与严格的死亡区分开来，这使他们再次陷入经院哲学的偏见，使灵魂完全脱离躯体，甚至赞成那些心智不健全的人所持的灵魂有死的观点。

解释：

莱布尼茨将作为精神实体的单子的一中之多的状态称为知觉。值得重视的是，当莱布尼茨把单子定义为精神时，他大大地拓展了精神的范围：知觉不能等同于有意识的知觉，还应该包括整个无意识领域；精神不能等同于人的心灵，还应该包括“ 动物的灵魂或其他的隐得来希”。这样一来，精神的疆界变得无比宽广，从而得以真正成为世界的本体。

在此，莱布尼茨批判了笛卡尔派的否认“人们意识觉察不到的知觉”的存在、将精神等同于人的有意识的心灵的狭隘见解，认为这会将长期的无意识和严格的死亡混为一谈。在莱布尼茨看来，躯体是无意识的知觉的某种产物，与被创造的单子不可分离，而否认无意识的知觉，必然会导致“灵魂完全脱离躯体”的错误见解。笛卡尔派的狭隘的心灵观甚至会导向怀疑灵魂的永恒性，因为只有承认无意识的知觉，才能保证精神的持续不断的存在。

15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that desire [l’appetit] cannot always fully attain to the whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it and attains to new perceptions.

那种产生变化或从一个知觉向另一个知觉的过渡的内在原则的活动被称作欲求。诚然，欲求不能完全达到它所指向的全部知觉，但他们总会有所收获并达到新的知觉。

解释：

知觉和欲求是单子的两个紧密联系的根本规定。每个被创造的单子都以上帝的全知、全能和全善为其最终欲求目的，但这是不可能彻底达到的，因而每个单子都表现为永不停息的追求和运动。

16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who admit that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity in the Monad; and M. Bayle ought not to have found any difficulty in this, as he has done in his Dictionary, article ‘Rorarius.’

当我们在我们所意识到的最细微的念头中也能发现它包含着一些不同的对象时，我们就在自身体验到了单纯实体中的多样性。因而所有那些承认灵魂是单纯实体的人也应该承认单子中的这种多样性；贝尔先生也不应该在此发现困难，如他在他的辞典“罗拉留”辞条中所做的那样。

解释：

在此莱布尼茨以人的意识活动为例，再次论证单子的“一中之多”的特性：人的意识活动本身是“一”，意识活动总是有多样性的内容则是“多”。

皮埃尔·贝，1647 –1706) ，是法国主张怀疑论的新教神学家在其《历史与批判词典》的 “罗拉留”（1485－1556，主张动物有理性）辞条中，以人的理性的软弱无力这一怀疑主义思想批判了莱布尼茨的理性神学观点。

17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities of simple substances can consist. (Theod. Pref. [E. 474; G. vi. 37].)

此外，必须承认，知觉以及依赖于知觉的东西，不能用机械的原因来解释，也就是说，不能用形状和运动来解释。假设有一架机器，被制作得能够思想、感受和拥有知觉，想象它在保持同一比例的情况下在尺寸上被放大，以至于人们可以像走进磨坊一样进入它。在这种情况下，在考察它的内部的时候，我们只能看到一些部分作用于另一部分，而决找不到任何能够解释知觉的东西。因此，只能在单纯实体中而非在复合物或机器中寻找知觉。况且，在单纯实体中能被找到的只有这个（即知觉及其变化）。单纯实体的全部内在运动也仅在于此。（参见《神正论》序言，[E. 474; G. vi. 37]）

解释：

莱布尼茨此处的例子是指能够知觉的机器是不可能存在的，因为作为实体的特性的知觉是一种质的规定，不能用机械论的量的观点来解释。

18. All simple substances or created Monads might be called Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (echousi to enteles); they have a certain self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.)

所有的单纯实体或被创造的单子都可被称为隐得来希，因为它们自身之内都具有某种完满性；他们具有某种自足性，使得他们成为自身内在活动的源泉，也就是说，无形体的自动机。（参见《神正论》，第87节）

解释：

“隐得来希”在希腊文中原义指“完满”、“完整”，亚里斯多德用“隐得来希”一词表示从潜能到现实的运动，莱布尼茨的“隐得来希”强调单子的圆满性和自足性，更接近该词的本义。

单子或“隐得来希”的圆满性和自足性是有限的，要不然就和上帝没有区别了。单子为上帝所创造并被赋予了运动的原则，因而每个单子都是自我运动的、自足的，不需要任何外界的影响。