19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.

如果我们把灵魂一词赋予具有我所解释的一般意义的知觉和欲求的所有事物，那么所有的单纯实体或被创造的单子都可被称作灵魂；但因为感受包含了比赤裸的知觉更多的东西，所以我同意单子或隐得来希这种一般的名称对于仅仅具有知觉的单子而言是足够的，灵魂这一名称应该被给与那些具有更清晰的知觉、有记忆相伴随的单子。

解释：

莱布尼茨按知觉的清晰程度把单子分成三个等级：最低级的是赤裸的单子，只具有最含混的无意识的知觉；其次是灵魂（soul）,具有有意识的知觉即感受，有记忆相伴随；再次是心灵（mind）或精神(spirit),其知觉具有自我意识和理性。

20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)

我们在自己身上体验到一种情形，即我们对之没有任何记忆且没有任何可辨识的知觉；如我们陷入昏迷或深沉的无梦的睡眠的时候。在这种状态下灵魂与赤裸的单子之间没有可觉察的区别；但由于这一状态是不持久的，灵魂会从中摆脱出来，灵魂是某种比赤裸的单子更丰富的东西。（参见《神正论》第64节）

21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time put animals into this condition.

这并不意味着，在这一状态中单纯实体没有任何知觉。根据前面给出的理由这是不可能的；因为它不能在没有某种性质也就是知觉的情况下停止存在或继续存在。可是当一个人具有无数微小的知觉，其中却无一清晰，这时他就昏迷了；就象朝某个方向连续转圈若干次，会使我们头晕目眩而昏厥，不能分辨任何东西。死亡能够在某段时间内把动物置于这种状态。

22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future; (Theod. 350.)

既然单纯实体的现在状态是其前一状态的自然结果，同样地，它的现在就孕含了将来。（参见《神正论》第350节）

23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion can in a natural way come only from a motion. (Theod. 401-403.)

由于我们一从昏迷中觉醒过来就意识到知觉，我们在觉醒之前一定也具有知觉，尽管我们完全不能意识到它们；因为知觉只能以自然的方式源于另一（在先的）知觉，就象一个运动以自然的方式源于另一（在先的）运动①。（参见《神正论》第401-403节）

24. It thus appears that if we had in our perceptions nothing marked and, so to speak, striking and highly-flavoured, we should always be in a state of stupor. And this is the state in which the bare Monads are.

由此可知，如果我们知觉中没有那些清晰的，也就是说，显著的和极有特色的东西，我们就会永远处于昏迷之中。而这正是赤裸的单子所处的状态。

解释：

在第20－24节中，莱布尼茨认为人的无意识状态与赤裸的单子是非常类似的，即都没有任何清晰的知觉，从而说明赤裸的单子确实是存在的或至少其存在是可以设想的。莱布尼茨认为，无意识的知觉必然是存在的，否则单子就失去其恒存性而不成其为实体，人在昏迷或无梦的睡眠这些无意识状态中就陷入死亡而无法苏醒了。

25. We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs, which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us. And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs.

我们也看到，大自然通过赋予动物以感觉器官而给与了它们强化的知觉，这些感觉器官把无数的光线和空气的波动收集起来，通过把它们结合起来而使其具有更显著的效果。同样的事情也发生于嗅觉、味觉和触觉，以及大概不为人所知的一些其他的感官。我不久将解释，为何在灵魂中所发生的事能够反映感官中所发生的事。

解释：

动物的单子（灵魂）因具有感觉器官而拥有了较清晰的、有意识的、有记忆的知觉。至于物质性的感官何以能够与无形体的灵魂相沟通这一问题，莱布尼茨用他的“前定和谐”理论加以解释。

26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Preliminary Discourse, sec. 65.)

记忆为灵魂提供一种连贯性，这种连贯性虽类似于理性，却有必要与理性区别开来。我们注意到，如果动物以前曾被某物殴打，当它们又见到此物时，记忆中的表象会驱使它们去期待在以往的知觉中与该物相连的东西，它们会产生与以前的情形中类似的感受。例如，当人向狗举起棍子的时候，狗会记起棍子曾造成的痛苦，就嚎叫着跑开了。(参见《神正论》初步论述，第65节)

27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated ordinary perceptions.

那些刺激并驱动它们的心理印象的力量源于以往知觉的强度或数量。因为一个强烈的印象常立即产生与长期形成的习惯或许多经常重复的普通知觉相同的效果。

解释：

记忆使得动物能够将特定的知觉联系在一起形成习惯性的联想，从而使动物的行为具有某种一贯性。

28. In so far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals, resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our actions we are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on rational grounds.

就其知觉的连贯性仅在于记忆的原则而言，人的行为类似于动物，就象经验主义的医生，只有实践而缺乏理论。实际上，我们在自身的四分之三的行为上都是经验主义者。例如，当我们预期明天会有白昼的时候，我们只是凭经验，因为直到目前事情一直是这样的。只有天文学家才能以理性的根据对此进行思考。

解释：

作为理性主义者，莱布尼茨认为只有普遍性的理性知识才使人与动物区别开来，人的经验与动物的联想并没有本质不同。

29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [esprit].

但只有必然的、永恒的真理才将我们与单纯的动物区分开来，给予我们理性和科学，将我们提升到具有关于我们自身和上帝的知识。这就是我们之内所谓的理性灵魂或心灵。

30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths, and through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of reflexion, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that this or that is within us；and thus, thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial, and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in Him without limits. And these acts of reflexion furnish the chief objects of our reasonings. (Theod. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27].)

也正是凭借必然真理的知识以及它们的抽象表达，我们才提升到具有反思活动，这使我们能够思维所谓“自我”，并观察到这或那处于“我们”之中；就这样，通过思维自我，我们也就思维到存在、实体，思维到单纯物和复合物，以及非实在之物和上帝自身，并设想在我们身上有限的却会在上帝之中没有限制。这些反思的活动为我们（当前的形而上学）①的推理提供了主要对象。（参见《神正论》前言，[E. 469; G. vi. 27]）

解释：

人作为理性灵魂或心灵，凭借着对必然真理的理性知识的认识，而拥有了反思活动，具有了自我意识，并进而获得了有关存在、实体、复合物、上帝等的哲学真理。值得注意的是，在莱布尼茨那里，自我意识与理性的反思能力紧密相连、密不可分，而对自我意识的反思则是形而上学的源泉。作为德国哲学之父，莱布尼茨的这种注重主体性的哲学倾向对德国古典哲学的发展有着非常深远的影响。